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USING FAIR RETURN PRICES TO ASSESS THE VALUE AND 
COST OF FINANCIAL GUARANTEES FOR NEW NUCLEAR 
POWER PLANTS 
Bernell K. Stone* 
ABSTRACT 
Financial guarantees change risk and therefore change the cost of 
financing and the return required by investors. Financial guarantees by 
the government are a form of subsidy. They are now pervasive in the 
energy sector and are proposed for new nuclear generating plants. Both 
the value to recipients and the cost to provide are difficult to assess for 
long-lived nonmarketable assets with great uncertainty about 
construction cost, operating cost, and prospective revenue. Therefore, in 
turn, it is difficult to assess potential costs for providing the guarantees. It 
is also difficult to compare financial guarantees with other types of 
subsidies (e.g. production credits). This Article adapts the idea of fair 
return rate regulation and the associated determination of a fair return 
price to the evaluation of a proposed project for generating nuclear 
power. Knowing the price required for a given level of return provides an 
easy-to-understand framework for assessing the value and cost of 
financial guarantees. The analysis can then be based on the difference in 
required return with and without guarantees to find the associated 
difference in required fair return price. 
From the viewpoint of policy analysis and strategic planning, the 
merits of using differences in fair return prices include the fact that they 
are (1) easy to understand, (2) scale independent, and (3) consistent with 
both standard capital investment analysis and the fair return pricing that 
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takes place in setting rates at the level of the overall utility. More 
importantly, reducing the value/cost of financial guarantees to a 
difference in price per kilowatt-hour makes financial guarantees easy to 
compare with production credits and other alternative subsidies that 
directly impact price and/or that can be easily translated into a price per 
kilowatt-hour. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This Article has two primary purposes. First, it provides a non-
technical overview and illustrative examples of the methodology for 
converting input assumptions about the required return on invested 
capital as well as assumptions about required capital outlays, operating 
costs, and operating efficiency into an associated fair return price. 
Second, this Article uses best case operating costs and industry estimates 
of the capital outlays to address the four key questions on value, cost, 
default probability, and market viability when applied to federal 
government debt guarantees for new nuclear power plants. 
A debt guarantee refers to a commitment by one party to assume 
responsibility for performance on a debt contract or commitment when 
the primary party cannot perform. This Article addresses a particular 
type of debt guarantee, namely a federal government guarantee for a 
substantial portion of the debt of a risky capital investment project (e.g., 
the 80% debt guarantee for new nuclear power plants in the Energy 
Policy Act of 20051). A federal government debt guarantee is a subsidy. 
In order to understand and evaluate federal government debt guarantees 
as incentives for undertaking desirable capital investment projects, 
policymakers and the public need to understand four critical factors: 
(1) Value: The value of the guarantee to the recipient company 
or organization must be determined. 
(2) Cost: The likely cost to the government (or, ultimately, to 
taxpayers) of this subsidy compared to alternative subsidies 
and incentives must be determined. 
(3) Default Probability and Default Cost: Default probability 
refers to the chance that the company/organization receiving 
the federal debt guarantee will default so that the federal 
government will have to perform on the guarantee. Default 
cost is the amount that the government would have to pay to 
 
 1. Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594 [hereinafter Energy Policy Act] 
(providing for guarantees of 80% of the financing of new nuclear plants subject to DOE approval).  
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honor the guarantee. 
(4) Economic Viability: Economic viability refers to the ability to 
generate earnings at least sufficient to service the guaranteed 
debt and ideally to service all project debt and earn as well at 
least a fair return on invested equity. When a substantial 
fraction of project debt is guaranteed, having economic 
viability is the key requirement for not having default occur 
and thus for assessing both default probability and cost. 
Because a debt guarantee is a financial subsidy, its value, cost, and 
default risk are usually expressed in financial impact terms, such as 
change in debt cost, change in debt capacity, change in required project 
return, and change in project net present value.2 While these financial 
impact characterizations are understandable to economists and finance 
professionals, neither policymakers nor the general public find them easy 
to understand or easy to compare with alternative subsidies. Many other 
subsidies are either quoted in price terms or can be easily translated into 
price impacts.3 For instance, production subsidies are quoted as 
additional payments per unit of subsidized production. Tax credits and 
other output-based tax benefits per unit of output (such as depletion 
allowances) can also be easily translated into a direct price impact. Even 
pollution charges can be translated into a change in price required to 
recover the charge. 
Translating debt guarantees and other financial subsidies into prices 
has several benefits. First, prices are easier for policymakers and the 
public to understand in terms of value of the incentive to the receiving 
company/organization. Second, prices and price impacts are the common 
numeraire for the evaluation of most other policies. Therefore, 
converting debt guarantees into price impact provides for easier 
comparison with alternative policies.4 Finally, for alternative methods of 
 
 2.  See U.E. Reinhardt, Break-Even Analysis for Lockheed’s Tristar: An Application of 
Financial Theory, 27 J. FIN. 821-38 (1972) [hereinafter Reinhardt] (serving as an example of a debt 
guarantee evaluated thoroughly in terms of debt cost, overall financing cost, and net present value 
(in preference to the simpler payback measure)). The federal debt guarantee for the Lockheed 
TriStar and the Reinhardt framework are both summarized more thoroughly infra Section III. 
 3.  In addition to the price subsidies, taxes, and direct charges mentioned here, see Table 23 
for a list of ten subsidies to incentivize shale oil development. This list of ten incentives with 
summary evaluation including subsidy effect, includes, in addition to loan guarantees, both 
subsidized interest and accelerated depreciation as additional financial subsidies. U. S. experience 
with shale oil guarantees is treated further in Section III of this Article. See generally, OFFICE OF 
TECH. ASSESSMENT, EVALUATION OF POTENTIAL FINANCIAL INCENTIVES FOR OIL SHALE 
DEVELOPMENT: AN ASSESSMENT OF SHALE OIL TECHNOLOGIES (1980). 
 4.  Financial subsidies are not alone in being difficult to convert into a price or a price 
change. There are other policies, especially pollution regulations capping the level of emissions that 
involve uncertain prices and/or that entail capital outlays that are also difficult to reduce to price 
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generating electricity, answering the questions of market viability, 
likelihood of default, and the ultimate expected cost, can all be reduced 
to the price per kilowatt-hour with the debt subsidy compared to 
competitive prices from other generation alternatives. 
This Article addresses the conversion of federal debt guarantees into 
an associated price impact. It focuses on federal debt guarantees for long-
lived capital investment projects that guarantee a high percentage of the 
financing (e.g., the provision for 80% federal debt guarantees for the 
financing of new nuclear power plants in the Energy Policy Act of 
20055). The key idea is to adapt traditional net present value methods for 
capital budgeting to solve for a fair return price (or, a competitive return 
price) given assumptions about costs and operating efficiency.6 The 
difference between the fair return price with a federal debt guarantee and 
the fair return price without the guarantee is a price-based measure of the 
value of the guarantee. 
In this Article, fair return price is defined as the price of electricity 
that provides a rate of return on invested capital just equal to an assumed 
fair return on investment given assumptions about certain factors, 
including construction costs (capital outlays), operating costs, operating 
efficiency, and plant life. Fair return price in this Article is a market-
based fair return that should reflect current interest rates and risk to both 
debt and equity providers. This market-based fair return price is not 
necessarily the same as the prices that would be set by a utility 
commission to provide a regulatory fair return on invested capital for 
regulated electric utilities.7 However, as established in Section IV, they 
 
impacts. One example is the use of caps on overall emission levels (such as carbon caps and overall 
greenhouse gas caps) that have a price impact but involve a market trading mechanism to determine 
the price impact and therefore have a direct price impact, but with an uncertain price. Another 
example is an emission standard (such as maximum levels of sulfur or nitrogen in stack gases) that 
requires an investment in pollution control equipment and possibly an additional operating cost and 
therefore requires fairly complex economic-engineering analyses to determine the associated price 
impact. 
 5.  See Energy Policy Act, supra note 1. 
 6. ―Capital budgeting‖ refers to the economic evaluation of capital investment projects. See 
Harold Bierman, Jr., Section 9: Capital Budgeting, in HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE FINANCE (Edward 
I. Altman ed., 5th ed. 1986), for easy to read background on net present value capital budgeting 
methods with net present value summarized well at 9-17 to 9-21. See also the capital budgeting 
chapters of any introductory corporate finance text, such as RICHARD A. BREALEY ET AL., 
FUNDAMENTALS OF CORPORATE FINANCE, (McGraw-Hill Irwin, 5th ed. 2007), especially Chapters 
7–9 at 180–263. 
 7. For background on electric utility rate regulation and especially the idea of a fair return on 
invested capital, see generally CHARLES F. PHILIPS, JR., THE REGULATION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES: 
THEORY AND PRACTICE (Public Utility Reports 3d ed. 1993). Chapter 8, ―The Rate Base,‖ treats the 
definition of the rate base, that part of invested capital for which investors can claim a right to a fair 
return, including the legal cases/precedents up to 1993 pertaining to the rate base. Chapter 9, ―The 
Rate of Return,‖ treats judicial fair return issues. In the subsection on ―Judicial Concepts,‖ Philips 
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should generally be very close. 
Moreover, in today’s deregulated electric power generation market, 
the companies/organizations that are the owner-developers of a nuclear 
power project are generally not a regulated electric utility.8 Refinement 
of this definition as a return able to service debt and provide a fair market 
return on invested equity is developed further in Sections IV and V 
(including its relation to the regulatory fair return on invested capital) 
and illustrated in Sections VI, VII, and VIII. 
Section II of this Article provides background information on global 
climate change and the current critical role of federal government debt 
guarantees in low carbon nuclear electricity strategy for the United 
States. Section III provides a background discussion on federal financial 
guarantees for capital investment projects. Section IV reviews 
frameworks for assessing the value of financial guarantees and focuses 
on the adaptation of traditional capital investment project valuation 
methods to solve for the fair return price associated with assumptions 
about costs and a given discount rate. Section V presents an illustrative 
example of this proposed methodology using differences in required 
returns with a financial guarantee and without a financial guarantee to 
obtain differences in the associated fair return prices. Section VI 
discusses the disagreements/uncertainty surrounding both construction 
costs and operating costs. Continuing the example introduced in Section 
V, it then illustrates cost- based sensitivity analysis by summarizing fair 
return prices for a range of possible construction costs. Section VII 
continues treating uncertainty in costs and rates. It establishes the 
required price per kilowatt-hour with a financial guarantee (i.e., with 
low-cost, subsidized financing) as a critical and easy-to-understand 
measure of economic viability. The proposed viability assessment is a 
straightforward comparison of the fair return price with either current 
prices or with electricity prices from other competing generation 
alternatives. Section VIII uses the fair return price for the best possible 
case of nuclear operating costs and industry hopes for plant construction 
 
notes that ―judicial concepts of a fair return are few and far between.‖ He notes: (1) a fair rate of 
return should be higher than one that entails confiscation, (2) no single rate of return is always fair, 
and (3) public utilities are not guaranteed a fair rate of return. Id. 
 8.  See JOEL KLEIN, CAL. ENERGY COMM’N, COMPARATIVE COSTS OF CALIFORNIA 
CENTRAL STATION ELECTRICITY GENERATION TECHNOLOGIES, CEC-200-2009-017-SD (Aug. 2009) 
(recognizing explicitly that there are at least three different ownership structures, namely: (1) 
merchant non-utility independent power generators, (2) investor owned electric utilities, and (3) 
public electric utilities. Each have different risks, debt capacities, and required returns on power 
generation projects); also, the different debt capacities, debt cost rates, and overall required returns 
are reflected by solving for a different required price in all the summary tables for each of twenty-
one alternative generation technologies evaluated. See id. 
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costs first to determine economic viability and then to assess the 
likelihood of default. Section IX first lists methodology contributions and 
then summarizes final conclusions. 
II. GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE NEED FOR LOW CARBON 
ELECTRICITY GENERATION 
Concerns with climate change have led to a global focus on reducing 
carbon in the atmosphere. Of particular concern is reducing the emission 
of carbon from fossil fuels for the generation of electricity. However, the 
reduction of carbon emissions is believed to have a number of economic 
costs, including possible changes in national competitiveness. First, there 
is capture or other control of carbon from current fossil fuel electricity 
generation, especially coal-based electric generation. Second, it is 
generally believed that, with the possible exception of wind-generated 
electricity, low carbon electricity generation is simply much more 
expensive than fossil fuel (especially coal-based) electricity generation.9 
The Kyoto Protocol was an attempt to coordinate carbon reductions 
by obtaining national commitments for lower carbon emission targets.10 
Notably, the United States refused to ratify,11 primarily because of the 
perceived high conformity costs and asymmetric distribution of the cost 
burden.12 
Since Kyoto, states seem to have varying climate change strategies, 
including those aimed at electricity generation. For example, state 
strategies differ even within the European Union. Germany and Spain 
both represent strong state commitment to renewables by offering tax 
credits and production subsidies as incentives.13 In contrast, France 
 
 9.  See id. at 14–24 (providing a thorough cost projection, comparing levelized costs, and 
noting that only wind and hydro have a lower cost per kilowatt-hour than coal and natural gas 
generation alternatives). 
 10.  See Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 
22, U.N. Doc FCCC/CP/1997/7/Add.1, 37 I.L.M. (Dec. 10, 1997), available at 
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/kpeng.pdf. 
 11. See Kyoto Protocol: Status of Ratification, U.N. Framework Convention on Climate 
Change 3 (Jan. 14, 2009), available at 
http://unfccc.int/files/kyoto_protocol/status_of_ratification/application/pdf/ kp_ratification.pdf 
(indicating that the United States has signed but not ratified the Protocol). 
 12.  See Cass R. Sunstein, Of Montreal and Kyoto: A Tale of Two Protocols, 31 HARV. 
ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 27 (2007) (―By far the largest loser, in terms of the actual anticipated costs of 
mandatory cuts, was the United States.‖). 
 13.  See Mark Landler, Germany Debates Subsidies for Solar Industry, N. Y. TIMES, May 16, 
2008, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/16/business/worldbusiness/16solar.html?ex=1368676800&en=781
6e306c4840eec&ei=5124&partner=permalink&exprod=permalink. 
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already uses highly subsidized nuclear to generate approximately 80% of 
its electricity.14  
While the United States has not undertaken new nuclear power 
plants since the 1970s, the current U.S. strategy for baseload low-carbon 
electricity is to preserve the almost 20% of U.S. electricity generation 
currently produced from nuclear.15 The Energy Information Agency 
(EIA) has made baseload capacity projections, including projections of 
additional nuclear power plant capacity. The Department of Energy 
(DOE) has estimated fifty more nuclear plants by 2030 and more than 
one hundred by 2050.16 
The provision of financial guarantees for debt financing of the 
proposed new nuclear plants is central to the current U.S. strategy. The 
Energy Policy Act of 2005 provides for federal guarantees of debt 
financing for up to 80% of a nuclear generation project.17 DOE approval 
is required for a particular nuclear project to obtain the federal guarantee 
of its debt. The industry views the debt guarantees as critical for 
proceeding with new nuclear power plants.18 
Knowing the value and likely cost of financial guarantees is essential 
to intelligent nuclear energy policy—for not only the United States but 
also for the many other states now considering and/or engaging in similar 
strategies.19 In addition to policy and planning, knowing the value, cost, 
 
 14.  See Steve Kidd, Nuclear in France—What Did They Get Right?, NUCLEAR ENG’G INT’L, 
June 22, 2009, available at http://www.neimagazine.com/story.asp?storyCode=2053355. 
 15.  See Dep’t of Energy, U.S. Energy Information Administration: Independent Statistics and 
Analysis, http://www.eia.doe.gov/ (last visited Jan. 28, 2010) [hereinafter Energy Information 
Administration] (providing data that summarizes Department of Energy projections of additions to 
current nuclear capacity, which are provided in several places on the EIA website); see also Richard 
Newell, Washington, D.C., Annual Energy Outlook 2010 Reference Case (Dec. 14, 2009), especially 
Slide 20 (providing a brief current summary of this information and other past and projected 
electrical energy generation); U.S. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION: INDEPENDENT 
STATISTICS AND ANALYSIS, ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2010: REFERENCE CASE 20 (2009), 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/neic/speeches/newell121409.pdf. 
 16.  See generally Energy Information Administration, supra note 15. 
 17. See Energy Policy Act, supra note 1. 
 18.  The Energy Policy Act provides for guarantees of 80% of the financing of new nuclear 
plants subject to DOE approval. In a speech to the Nuclear Energy Assembly, John Rowe (President 
and CEO Exelon Corp and Chairman of the Board, Nuclear Energy Institute) reported on progress in 
actually obtaining the DOE approval for the 80% debt guarantees for particular projects to build new 
nuclear power plants. Rowe refers to the approvals ―from the Department of Energy for the loan 
guarantee program, which is so essential to financing new nuclear plants.‖ John Rowe, Pres. Exelon 
Corp., Speech before the Nuclear Energy Assembly: Nuclear Energy 2008: State of the Industry, 
(May 6, 2008) (emphasis added). In reporting on the approvals up to the time of his speech, Rowe 
adds: ―approximately $20 billion in loan volume authorized in 2008 and 2009 – a good start.‖ Id. 
 19.  Like France, Korea is both building and seeking to build new nuclear plants. India and 
the United States have negotiated cooperation for up to sixty new nuclear power plants in India. In 
addition to Iran, many Middle Eastern states are seeking help in constructing and/or operating 
nuclear power plants. 
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and risk of financial guarantees for nuclear is important knowledge for 
state utility commissions, utility executives and planners, equipment-
infrastructure suppliers, investors, and even credit rating agencies.20 
Finally, U.S. ability to produce low-carbon electricity economically is 
vital to the new round of U.N.-sponsored global climate treaty 
negotiations that occurred in December 2009 in Sweden. While 
knowledge of and confidence in the ability to produce low-carbon 
electricity are pertinent to the way the United States negotiates, they are 
even more critical to obtaining Congressional approval for any treaties 
developed. 
Ultimately, there is a clear need to assess properly both the value and 
cost of financial guarantees for new nuclear. In addition to a technically 
correct economic assessment, there is a need to structure both the value 
and cost assessments in terms understandable to policymakers and other 
key players. 
III. BACKGROUND: FEDERAL FINANCIAL GUARANTEES FOR CAPITAL 
INVESTMENT PROJECTS 
As already noted, the aim of this Article is to develop a framework 
for assessing both the value and the cost of federal debt guarantees for 
long-lived risky capital investment projects such as the 80% debt 
guarantees in the Energy Policy Act of 2005. As background, this Article 
reviews two prior instances of federal guarantees for capital investment 
projects. Section A considers Lockheed TriStar as an example of the 
value of federal debt guarantees. Section B considers the Exxon-Tosco 
Colony Oil Shale Project as an example of using federal financial 
guarantees to incentivize development of synthetic fuels. Section C then 
analyzes and compares these two examples. 
A. Example One: Federal Debt Guarantees for the Lockheed TriStar 
The Lockheed TriStar is a classic example of the value of federal 
debt guarantees that has received formal academic analysis.21 Economist 
Uwe E. Reinhardt’s treatment of the Lockheed TriStar is especially 
 
 20.  STANDARD AND POOR’S, 2008A: THE RACE FOR THE GREEN: HOW RENEWABLE 
PORTFOLIO STANDARDS COULD AFFECT U.S. UTILITY CREDIT QUALITY 11 (Mar. 10, 2008); 
STANDARD AND POOR’S, 2008B: ASSESSING THE CREDIT RISK OF COMPETING TECHNOLOGIES FOR 
NEW U.S. NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS (Aug.13, 2008); STANDARD AND POOR’S, 2008C: 
CONSTRUCTION COSTS TO SOAR FOR NEW U.S. NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS (Oct. 15, 2008) 
[collectively hereinafter STANDARD AND POOR’S] (developing credit-focused assessments of nuclear 
costs and risks). 
 21. See generally Reinhardt, supra note 2. 
WINTER 2009  Assess the Value 
91 
 
pertinent to the subsidy assessment framework proposed here for two 
reasons.22 First, Reinhardt convincingly establishes that subsidy merit 
and especially economic viability should use net present value capital 
budgeting methods23 rather than the simple dollar breakeven criterion 
used by Lockheed.24 The net present value capital budgeting methods 
advocated by Reinhardt are the underlying valuation framework used 
here to convert financing rates into fair return electricity prices. Second, 
Reinhardt uses the weighted average cost of capital as the project 
discount rate (fair required return for economic viability) and explicitly 
recognizes uncertainty in the discount rate for both the role of the relative 
use of debt and equity and for uncertainty about the economically correct 
costs for debt and especially equity. As a consequence, Reinhardt uses 
discount rate sensitivity analysis (a range of possible discount rates) to 
treat this uncertainty in the required return as done in this Article in 
Sections VII and VIII. 
In 1971, both the Senate25 and House26 held hearings to assess a 
request by Lockheed, a major defense contractor, for the federal 
government to guarantee a $250 million bank credit line loan for $250 
million. The stated purpose of the bank loan was to allow Lockheed first 
to complete its in-process development of the Lockheed TriStar (at that 
time, a new generation of wide-body, high-passenger-capacity, fuel-
efficient jet plane for which Lockheed had already invested 
approximately a billion for development and other TriStar start-up 
expenses) and then to finance plant construction and start-up plane 
production.27 Without a guarantee, Lockheed spokesmen testified that 
they could not obtain the required financing. With a guarantee, the bank 
loan would cost 5% to 6%. Before Lockheed’s financing crisis, the 
 
 22.  See id. at 834–35 (focusing especially on Section III-B, ―The Economic Value of the Tri 
Star Program in 1971‖). 
 23. Capital budgeting refers to the economic evaluation of capital investment projects. See 
Bierman, supra note 6; see also supra text accompanying note 6. 
 24.  In arguing that the TriStar project was economically viable, Lockheed spokesman used 
simple breakeven analysis as their measure of economic of viability. As explained well by 
Reinhardt, simple breakeven analysis only measures the ability of project cash income to cover the 
initial capital outlays. The deficiency of breakeven is that there is no provision for debt interest 
payments let alone a fair return on invested equity. 
 25.  See Hearings on Emergency Loan Guarantees Legislation, Parts 1 and 2 Before S. 
Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 92d Cong. (1971) [hereinafter Hearings on 
Emergency]. 
 26.  See Hearings on Legislation to Authorize Emergency Loan Guarantees to Major 
Business Enterprise Before H. Comm. on Banking and Currency, 92nd Cong. (1971). 
 27. In testimony before the House Committee on Banking and Currency, Lockheed 
spokespersons argued that the project itself was economically sound but that Lockheed had run out 
of debt capacity because of cost overruns on unrelated defense contracts. See Hearings on 
Emergency, supra note 25. 
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before-tax cost of debt to Lockheed was 10% to 12% annual interest cost 
in the late 1960s.28 Taking the difference between the 10 to 12% cost of 
debt financing without a guarantee and the 5 to 6% cost with a federal 
guarantee, the federal debt guarantee would reduce the annual interest 
cost for Lockheed by at least 5% to 6%. The phrase ―at least‖ refers to 
the fact that Lockheed’s cost of debt would be greater in 1971 than in the 
late 1960s because Lockheed was much less risky before the cost 
overruns and the associated financing crisis that prompted the request for 
the federal guarantee. The concern here is not the precise numerical 
magnitude of the interest cost reduction from the fundamental guarantee, 
but rather the fact that the reduction in interest expense was a significant 
amount. 
The pertinent key facts are that Lockheed was granted the guarantee, 
produced the planes, and repaid the debt. Thus, the Lockheed TriStar can 
be viewed as an example where a company received value without 
significant out-of-pocket federal costs. The public received jobs, 
preserved a major aerospace defense contractor/manufacturer, and 
ensured a viable competitor for a new generation of efficient commercial 
jet aircraft. 
B. Example Two: Financial Guarantees for the Exxon-Tosco Colony 
Shale Oil Project 
The United States has previous experience with a range of subsidies 
including federal financial guarantees to incentivize development of 
synthetic fuels, especially shale oil development. In 1980, DOE 
committed $2.616 billion to three synthetic fuels projects. The largest of 
these three projects was the Exxon-Tosco Colony Oil Shale Project. It 
received a financial guarantee of $1.15 billion. In a recent review of past 
DOE synthetic fuels programs, Anthony Andrews notes that in 1980 
Exxon bought Tosco’s interest in the project, and announced plans to 
invest more than $5 billion for a planned 47,000 barrel per day plant in 
Garfield County, Colorado based on the Tosco retort design.29 However, 
Andrews reports that ―after spending more than $1 billion, Exxon 
announced on May 2, 1982 that it was closing the project and laying off 
2,200 workers‖ even after building a company town able to house more 
 
 28.  See Hearings on Emergency, supra note 25; Hearings on Legislation to Authorize 
Emergency Loan Guarantees to Major Business Enterprise Before the H. Comm. on Banking and 
Currency, 92d Cong., First Session, (1971); see also Reinhardt, supra note 2, at 821–38. 
 29. See ANTHONY ANDREWS, THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH 
SERVICES, OIL SHALE: HISTORY, INCENTIVES, AND POLICY 10 (Apr. 13, 2006). 
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than 2,000 workers.30 
While the Tosco retort design was a technically feasible method for 
producing synthetic crude oil, the project was abandoned because of the 
cost per barrel for the synthetic shale oil relative to the current and 
anticipated future market prices for crude oil. In an Article on the project 
termination, Time Magazine (Time) noted that ―Exxon’s long-term 
forecasts still anticipate an increase in oil prices, but not as rapid as 
previously expected.‖31 R. P. Larkins, the manager of the synthetic-fuels 
department at Exxon, stated ―nothing over the long-term would offset 
our costs.‖32 John Lichtblau, President of Petroleum Industry Research 
Foundation stated ―[t]he fact is that from a market point of view, most 
synfuel projects are not economically viable.‖33 Even with receiving a 
financial guarantee from the federal government, Exxon could not pursue 
this project of developing synthetic fuels because it was not in the 
company’s best economic interest. 
C. Lockheed and Colony Shale Oil Analysis 
Lockheed and Colony Shale Oil provide historical contrasts in the 
use of federal financial guarantees. Lockheed is an example where a 
financial guarantee provided a valuable financial subsidy with very little 
out-of-pocket cost to the federal government. The reason for successful 
production without performance on the guarantee by the federal 
government was the financial viability of the TriStar project. Lockheed 
could produce and sell aircraft at a profit sufficient to at least service the 
guaranteed debt. 
The Colony Oil Shale Project illustrates that financial guarantees can 
be a high risk strategy for incentivizing development that is not 
otherwise market competitive. If the financial guarantee subsidy 
(whether shale oil in the 1980s or new nuclear today) is not sufficient to 
ensure financial viability, then guaranteeing a high percentage of project 
financing lowers the cost of abandonment; this in turn means a high 
performance cost by the fundamental government and no realization of 
the desired production with its intended societal benefits. Andrews’s 
recent Congressional Research Service Report summarizes the 
unrealized but desired societal benefits of synthetic fuels: 
The United States Synthetic Fuels Corporation Act of 1980 (P.L. 96-
 
 30.  Id. 
 31.  John S. Demott et al., Energy: Setback for Synfuel, TIME, MAY 17, 1982, available at 
http://www.time.com/ time/magazine/article/0,9171,921222,00.html. 
 32.  Id. 
 33.  Id. 
INTERNATIONAL LAW & MANAGEMENT REVIEW VOLUME 6 
94 
 
294) established the U.S. Synthetic Fuels Corporation ―to improve the 
nation’s balance of payments, reduce the threat of economic disruption 
from oil supply interruptions, and increase the nation’s security by 
reducing its dependence on foreign oil.‖ The Corporation was authorized 
to provide financial assistance to qualified projects that produce synthetic 
fuel from coal, oil shale, tar sands, and heavy oils. Financial assistance 
could be awarded as loans, loan guarantees, price guarantees, purchase 
agreements, joint ventures, or combination of those types of assistance. 
An energy security reserve fund was also established in the U.S. 
Treasury and appropriated 19 billion to stimulate alternative fuel 
production.34 
While federal financial guarantees can provide support to companies 
for implementing various projects, these guarantees may still not be 
enough for some companies despite the social benefits the projects could 
provide. 
IV. VALUATION FRAMEWORKS FOR DETERMINING A FAIR RETURN 
PRICE 
A debt guarantee may be viewed in terms of options. There are two 
pertinent options. The recipient of the guarantee has the option to 
abandon the project if changes in costs, revenues, or other economic 
circumstances indicate that the project is no longer economically 
attractive.35 The debt providers have the option of a federal debt 
guarantee, which is itself an option to shift the obligation for financial 
performance to the federal government in the event of default.36 
If a project is not financially attractive, the company holding the 
guarantee can exercise its option to abandon it. With a debt guarantee, 
exercising the abandonment option may have a much lower cost than 
without a debt guarantee. This point is illustrated by the decision of 
Exxon to stop work on the Colony Shale Oil Project. At the time that 
Exxon stopped work, Exxon had invested approximately $1 billion of its 
planned investment of approximately $5 billion.37 
 
 34.  ANDREWS, supra note 29, at 27 (quoting Title 1, Part B of the Energy Security Act of 
1980). 
 35.  In capital budgeting, abandonment refers to the option to terminate a project once started 
if there are adverse changes in expected costs, revenue, or other economic circumstances. For more 
details on abandonment, see, e.g., BREALEY ET AL., supra note 6, at 255–56. 
 36.  See JOHN C. HULL, OPTIONS, FUTURES, AND OTHER DERIVATIVES 507–26 (6th ed. 2006) 
(providing the valuation of default protection generally). 
 37.  The option to abandon a project and the associated cost are part of the valuation of any 
capital investment project. For background on the abandonment option, readers are referred to any 
introductory corporate finance text. See, e.g., BREALEY ET AL., supra note 6, at 255–56. 
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Given the options associated with the debt guarantee, one might try 
to use option pricing methods to assess both the value of the 
abandonment option and the value of the federal protection from debt 
default. Option pricing is not the pertinent valuation approach. This is 
true for several reasons. One is simply the complexity of nuclear 
projects, including the disagreement on construction costs and operating 
costs and the absence of readily usable probability distributions for these 
cost inputs.38 Another pertains to understandability by policymakers, 
which is difficult to achieve given the mathematical complexity 
associated with option pricing. The most important reason pertains to the 
two primary objectives of this Article, namely: (1) to express the value of 
the financial guarantee subsidy as an electricity price so that both 
policymakers and the public can understand and compare the value of 
federal debt guarantees with alternative price impacting subsidies and 
charges; and (2) to use the fair return price per kilowatt-hour with the 
federal financial guarantee to assess economic viability and therefore 
provide a framework for assessing the likelihood of default and the 
associated cost of performing on the guarantee. For both of these 
objectives, the logical valuation framework is the use of traditional net 
present value capital investment methods to determine a fair return price. 
Because traditional project analysis methods obtain our policy 
objectives, it is clearly logical to use the net present value methods rather 
than option pricing methods. 
As noted in the Introduction, the primary purpose of this Article is to 
develop and illustrate an easy-to-understand framework that uses 
traditional capital investment analysis to obtain fair return prices for 
nuclear projects with and without guarantees. Recall that a fair return 
price is the price per kilowatt-hour that a nuclear plant would have to 
charge to provide a fair return on invested capital.39 The fair return 
project prices provide an easy-to-understand method for assessing project 
value and viability for given assumptions about costs. For a project that 
is economically viable, any good measure of the value of federal debt 
guarantee is reduced to assessing the difference in the fair return 
electricity prices for financing with a federal debt guarantee and without 
 
 38.  Federal financial guarantees on a capital investment project like a new nuclear power 
plant, both the value of the guarantee and its expected cost, are derived from several factors, which 
include the current value of the project, the likely distribution of project values over time, and 
especially the probability of default (option exercise) and the value distribution under default.  
 39.  As regulated monopolies, investor-owned electric utilities are presumed to earn a fair 
return on invested capital. Given invested capital and operating costs and an assumed quantity of 
electricity sold, the mechanism for providing a fair return on invested capital is to set the price per 
unit (price per kilowatt-hour) to provide the presumed fair return. 
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any financial guarantees. Assessing financial viability with a federal debt 
guarantee is a question of whether the fair return price is a market 
competitive price. 
In rate setting, the process of finding a fair return is applied to the 
overall utility capital base and overall cash flows. This Article adapts the 
fair return price setting to an individual generation project to see what 
price this project would have to command to provide a fair return on 
invested capital. 
In a classic textbook capital budgeting problem, one obtains a 
summary net present value (NPV) by discounting all project cash flows 
at a discount rate, which reflects the opportunity cost of capital.40 If the 
NPV is zero, the discount rate provides a fair return in the sense that the 
project has an internal rate of return that is equal to the opportunity cost 
of capital. If the project NPV is positive, the project provides a more-
than-fair return and the assumed price of electricity in projecting revenue 
could be reduced. Conversely, if the project NPV is negative, the project 
provides a less-than-fair rate of return. For the project to have an internal 
rate of return (IRR) equal to the discount rate, the price of electricity 
assumed in projecting cash flow would have to be increased. 
The above problem presents the key assumptions of this analysis. 
The factors are a scenario for operating costs, an assumed value for 
construction costs, and an assumed rate of capacity utilization. The result 
is a fair return price for the assumed discount rate used to compute the 
project NPV; or in other words, a price per kilowatt-hour that make the 
project IRR equal to the discount rate (the assumed required return on 
invested capital). 
Rather than assuming a given price and using a discount rate to solve 
for the net present value, one solves for the fair return price that makes 
the net present value of the cash flows equal to zero. This fair return 
price is the price per kilowatt-hour that makes the assumed discount rate 
(the assumed required return on invested capital) equal to the IRR. 
A financial measure of the value of the subsidy implicit in a federal 
debt guarantee is simply the change in the financing cost. An alternative 
price-based quantitative measure of the subsidy value associated with the 
change in financing cost is the change in the fair return price. Fair return 
price depends on not only the discount rate (required return) but also on 
the assumed construction costs, operating costs, and capacity utilization. 
For example, assume that the cost of land, licensing, and other 
 
 40.  Capital budgeting refers to the evaluation of capital investment projects. See BREALEY ET 
AL., supra note 6, at 238–91. 
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preconstruction costs is $500 per kilowatt of peak capacity. Assume 
further that the construction cost is $5000 per kilowatt-hour of peak 
capacity that is spent evenly at $1000 per year for five years. Thus, one 
can focus on the difference in fair return prices with a total capital cost of 
$5500, a value close to the best case current dollar cost estimate for the 
license application of Florida Power & Light nuclear plant.41 
As a first pass, assume that the project will sell its electricity at 13¢ 
per kilowatt-hour and that the plant operates at 70% capacity in year 6 
(its first year of operation) and increases to 90% by year 10. Assume that 
the operating cash expenses are just 49.5% of revenue (compared to 
74.5% as the industry average rate of cash expenses in 2007). Because 
one makes the heroic assumption that cash operating expenses are well 
below the current industry average cost rate, one calls this operating cost 
scenario the best possible operating cost scenario. 
Exhibit 3 summarizes the cash flows with the bottom line being the 
net cash flow in each year. The dotted line from year 11 to year 50 
indicates that the cash flows are the same in year 10 to year 50. For 
simplicity of exposition, this example uses the same value for operating 
costs in all years. Using current dollar costs in each year means that the 
solution procedure for the fair return price is also finding a 
corresponding current dollar fair return price.42 It reflects the fact that 
electricity prices tend to change in parallel with changes in the costs of 
generating electricity. It may understate slightly, however, the fair return 
price. Thus, one should interpret the fair return price in this Article as the 
current dollar price. 
Discounting these cash flows at discount rates of 6% and 8% gives 
net present values of +$660 and -$700 respectively. The positive net 
present value for 6% means the project has an IRR greater than 6% when 
the assumed price per kilowatt-hour is 13¢. If one solves for the price per 
kilowatt-hour that gives a net present value of zero and therefore an 
 
 41.  For the best case scenario in their licensing application, Florida Power & Light assumes 
five years for construction time and approximately $5600 in construction costs before land and 
licensing and before any inflation in materials or labor. See generally, Florida Power & Light, 
Nuclear Power Plant Approval/Construction Costs, 
http://www.fpl.com/environment/nuclear/approval.shtml (last visited Jan. 28, 2010). Here, 
construction costs exclude interest or other financing charges. 
 42.  The implicit assumption in using the current dollar projection is that prices for electricity 
and the overall level of operating cash expenses inflate at roughly the same rate. If nuclear operating 
prices were to inflate at a faster rate than overall electricity prices, then this simplification (made 
here primarily for expositional simplicity) would understate the fair return price at a given discount 
rate and would then overstate economic viability relative to a faster inflation future. In this sense, 
this current dollar projection may be slighted biased in favor of indicating that nuclear is more viable 
than in a future of more rapidly escalating costs. 
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internal rate of return of 6%, one finds that fair return price at a required 
return of 6% is just 11¢ per kilowatt-hour. 
For the case of an 8% discount rate, the negative net present value 
indicates that the assumed 13¢ per kilowatt-hour is not high enough to 
give the project an IRR of 8%.43 Given the assumed costs, the project 
can earn an 8% return only if the price is increased. Solving for the 
higher price that makes the net present value zero at an 8% discount rate 
gives a fair return price of 15¢ per kilowatt-hour. 
This example illustrates two points. First, given assumed costs, a 
higher return requires a higher price. Second, the fair return price is very 
sensitive to the discount rate: increasing the required return from 6% to 
8% increased the fair return price from 11¢ to 15¢ per kilowatt-hour, a 
change of 4¢. 
The sensitivity of the relationship between the fair required price and 
the discount rate is even more dramatic if one uses discount rates of 16% 
and 18%, which are illustrative of the rates that would be required 
without guarantees. For 16% and 18% discount rates, the associated fair 
return prices that make the net present value of all the cash flows zero are 
37¢ and 43¢, respectively. Given that these prices arise in the best 
possible scenario for operating costs and for relatively optimistic 
construction costs, it is clear why proponents of new nuclear want 
financial guarantees as the industry preferred form of subsidy: rates of 
37¢ and 43¢ are clearly uneconomic given that current prices average 
about 10¢ per kilowatt-hour. 
One can use differences in fair return prices for discount rates 
without a guarantee and with a guarantee to estimate a value for the 
guarantee. If the required return were 16% without a guarantee and just 
6% with a guarantee, then the associated price difference is 26¢ per 
kilowatt-hour (37¢ - 11¢ = 26¢). This change in fair return price means 
that the production subsidy equivalent of the implicit subsidy associated 
with a change in required return from 16% to 6% is 26¢. If the market 
rate were 18% and the guarantee rate were 8%, then the difference would 
be production subsidy equivalent of 31¢ (46¢ – 15¢). 
Whether the difference is 26¢ or 31¢, or anything close to these 
amounts, it is evident that the subsidy implicit in this type of financial 
guarantee is immense compared to a wind production credit of 0.5¢ per 
kilowatt-hour. Likewise, it is large compared to estimates of the increase 
in coal-generated electricity of about 2¢ to at most 3¢ from a tax of $45 
per ton of coal burned or carbon sequestration costs of about $50 per ton 
 
 43.  All electricity prices discussed here are rounded to the nearest cent. 
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of coal.44 
V. ESTIMATES OF SUBSIDIES FOR A RANGE OF CONSTRUCTION 
COSTS 
The above example used an assumed construction cost of $5000 per 
kilowatt of peak capacity and $500 for land and other start-up costs, 
providing for a total capital outlay of $5500 per kilowatt of peak 
capacity. Given that the construction cost is a subject of disagreement, 
providing the fair return price for a range of construction costs and 
discount rates is useful to policymakers. Exhibit 4 summarizes the fair 
return price for construction costs from $3000 to $9000, which results in 
a cost range of $3500 to $9500 with land and start-up of $500 added to 
the construction costs. 
The difference between the fair return prices for discount rates of 
18% and 8% is the production subsidy equivalent of a financial 
guarantee that changes the required return on a nuclear power plant from 
18% to 8%. Exhibit 4 shows that both the fair return prices and their 
differences increase rapidly with an increase in the construction outlay. 
Because of uncertainty about project costs, and therefore economic 
viability, risk to the providers of both debt and equity financing is high. 
Therefore, financing costs are high without a guarantee (about 16% to 
22%),45 and much lower with a guarantee (about 6% to 10%). Even the 
required returns are a subject of disagreement. As with construction cost 
uncertainty, policymakers, legislators, and investors can understand how 
differences in required returns changes the fair return price associated 
with difference costs. 
VI. FAIR RETURN PRICES FOR A RANGE OF COSTS AND DISCOUNT 
RATES 
Given that the United States has not undertaken any nuclear power 
generation projects since the early 1970s, there is no contemporary 
experience for building new nuclear power projects in the United States 
at current construction and material costs and current safety standards. 
Economist Mark Cooper wrote a review of estimates of nuclear 
power costs by more than thirty entities between 2001 and 2009 with 
estimates of construction costs (or, overnight costs) ranging from less 
 
 44.  See BRIAN J. MCPHERSON, UNIVERSITY OF UTAH, GEOLOGIC CARBON SEQUESTRATION 
AS AN APPROACH TO EMISSIONS REDUCTION & BENEFIT TO UTAH (2008). 
 45. See STANDARD AND POOR’S, supra note 20. 
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than $2000 to more than $10,000 per kilowatt-hour.46 This disagreement 
in overnight cost ranges complicate an assessment of how much nuclear 
electricity will cost and therefore uncertainty about its economic 
viability, which this Article assesses by the associated fair return price. 
Uncertainty in economic viability in turn translates into uncertainty about 
the value of federal financial guarantees and especially about the 
potential cost of federal financial guarantees. The time trend and source 
of cost estimates are both pertinent to understanding the disagreement 
about construction costs. 
Cooper notes a ―sharp increase in projected costs over a short period 
of time.‖47 In Figure III-1, Institutional Origins and Levels of Recent 
Cost Projections,48 Cooper plots estimates of overnight costs (in 2008 
dollars per kilowatt-hour) versus year of estimate. All fourteen estimates 
plotted in Figure III-1 developed between 2001 and 2005 are less than 
$3,500 per kilowatt-hour while 23 of the 24 estimates for 2007 to 2009 
are greater than $3500. For 2009, the six estimates (rounded to the 
nearest $100) range from $5,400/kwhr to $10,400/kwhr. He attributes the 
sharp time trend to two factors. One factor is inflation in cement, steel, 
and other construction materials at a higher rate than the increase in 
overall prices. The second factor is the viewpoint and type of entity 
making the projection. Early studies were made by proponents while 
later studies have been by critics and third parties such as credit rating 
agencies.49 
In any case, there is very little consensus. This lack of agreement 
indicates uncertainty and should signal high risk to policymakers and 
legislators, especially in light of overruns for projects undertaken in the 
1960s and 1970s. In that era all projects had actual construction costs 
that were at least double the estimated projection and the average 
overrun was four times the projection made in the initial authorization to 
build. 
Importantly, Cooper considered the assessment of operating costs.50 
Of the thirty-six studies he surveyed that disclosed operating cost detail, 
all but one used a very narrow subset of the operating expenses; for 
example, fuel and direct operating expenses or possibly just fuel, direct 
 
 46.  See MARK COOPER, THE ECONOMICS OF NUCLEAR REACTORS: RENAISSANCE OR 
RELAPSE?, VT. LAW SCHOOL, INST. FOR ENERGY AND THE ENV’T 11, 24, 30 (June 2009), especially 
Figure I-1 and Figure III-6. 
 47.  Id. at 22. 
 48.  See COOPER, supra note 46, at 24. 
 49. See STANDARD AND POOR’S, supra note 20. 
 50.  COOPER, supra note 46, at 27–28. 
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operating expenses, and direct maintenance costs.51 Thus, while possibly 
giving an indication of the cost to generate before transmission,52 
distribution, and all other operating expenses (like those summarized in 
Exhibit 2 for EIA standard industry income statements), these studies do 
not allow a realistic assessment of the retail price that utilities would 
have to charge their customers in order to provide a fair return on project 
capital. It is the retail price that determines the economic viability of new 
nuclear or any other competing technology. 
Because the fair return price depends on the construction costs, 
operating costs and capacity utilization, it seems impossible to assess the 
financing subsidy without having the assessment disputed on the basis of 
assumed costs and capacity utilization. One way to settle this cost 
uncertainty is to resolve the problem of finding fair return prices for a 
range of costs and even a range of discount rates. Exhibit 5 defines three 
operating cost scenarios. The best possible case is the one used in the 
previous examples, which means about 20% below current industry 
average operating expenses. This best possible scenario is the one that is 
most pertinent to assessing viability and therefore the likelihood of 
default. 
If the fair return price with a financial guarantee for best possible 
operating expenses and reasonable construction costs is not a 
competitive market price (at least no more than 3¢ to 5¢ above 
competing alternatives), then default is a virtual certainty. 
Exhibit 6 summarizes the price-rate dependency for construction 
costs ranging from $2000 per kilowatt of peak capacity to $9000 per 
kilowatt of peak capacity53 in steps of $1000 for a range of discount rates 
with the operating cost scenario, best possible operating expenses. 
Exhibit 6 illustrates two additional methodology ideas for structuring 
policy decisions in a more usable and understandable form. The first idea 
is simply to develop a summary fair return price response surface for a 
range of construction costs and discount rates for pertinent scenarios for 
operating expenses. The second idea pertains to assessing viability and 
the probability of default. The best possible operating expense scenario 
sets a threshold for assessing viability. If the fair return price for this 
scenario cannot compete with other generation alternatives, then nuclear 
 
 51. See id. 
 52.  This cost, usually called a Busbar cost, is useful for direct comparison of two similar 
generation alternatives but is not useful for policy analysis including especially issues of financial 
viability. Financial viability and the value of guarantees both depend on retail prices. 
 53.  With land and start-up costs of $500, the total capital outlay ranges from $2500 to $9500 
per kilowatt-hour of peak capacity. 
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cannot compete in any operating cost scenario even with financial 
guarantees. Default is a virtual certainty. 
Even though a range of discount rates and costs is covered, the data 
in Exhibit 6 are still dependent on the structural assumptions made in the 
Stone-Adolphson spreadsheet model.54 The point is not to argue the 
correctness of that model (from the Stone-Adolphson working paper), 
but rather to showcase methodology that can improve comparative policy 
analysis and decision-making.  
VII. SUMMARY, SYNTHESIS, AND CONCLUSIONS 
Climate change and energy are complex and interrelated concepts. 
The world is focused on multinational coordination and parallel 
formulation of national climate-energy policy. The United States serves 
as an example of a state that plans on extensive increases in the number 
of new nuclear power plants. To make new nuclear power economically 
viable in its private enterprise system of energy delivery, the current and 
presumed form for necessary subsidies is government financial 
guarantees for a high fraction of plant costs. 
Financial guarantees for long-lived assets are hard to evaluate using 
conventional option pricing (or insurance costing), especially when both 
construction costs and operating costs are difficult to predict. When 
financial guarantee values and costs are characterized by percentage 
changes in financing costs, they are difficult for most policymakers, 
legislators, and the general public to understand. Moreover, conventional 
use of changes in financing costs makes it difficult to compare the value 
and cost of subsidies as financial guarantees with other price-impacting 
subsidy alternatives, such as production credits and price guarantees, as 
well as cost-impacting laws such as taxes, carbon caps, and carbon 
charges. 
New nuclear, debate on climate treaties, formulation of natural 
energy policy, and public understanding are further confused by 
disagreement on construction costs, operating costs, and even the 
required financing rates with and without financial subsidies. A need 
exists for reliable and clear frameworks for evaluating new nuclear and 
comparing it with other low-carbon energy alternatives. There is 
especially a need to assess the value, potential cost, and societal risk 
associated with the proposed use of government financial guarantees. 
 
54. See Bernell K. Stone & Don L. Adolphson, A Financial-Economic Model of New Nuclear 
(Working Paper No. 2(12-2009), Global Energy Management, 2009), available at http://gemx.org/. 
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This Article makes three methodology contributions for greater 
understandability: 
(1)  Fair Return Prices: Converting differences in required 
returns into differences in fair return prices provides a 
subsidy assessment that allows comparison with production 
subsidies and other price impacting subsidies, laws, and 
regulations. Moreover, price per kilowatt-hour is relatively 
easy to understand and evaluate in terms of current 
electricity prices. 
(2)  Best Case Benchmark: Using the fair return price with a 
financial guarantee for best case costs to evaluate financial 
viability and therefore establishing the likelihood of default, 
thus the expected cost of performing on the guarantee. 
(3) Sensitivity Analysis Framework: Organize cost 
uncertainty/disagreement by using sensitivity analysis on 
construction costs and even discount rates to obtain a fair 
return price plot for pertinent ranges of costs and required 
returns. This allows policy makers to see the implications of 
the uncertain costs on fair return prices and therefore assess 
financial viability and risks. 
From the data and the analysis summarized in this Article, the 
primary conclusions about proposed new nuclear with government 
financial guarantees are: 
(1) Potentially High Subsidy Value: The production subsidy 
implied by differences in the fair return prices for high 
discount rates and low discount rates is large. It is much 
more than 10¢ per kilowatt hour and much more than the 
production subsidy required to make wind, thermal solar, 
photovoltaic solar, or geothermal into economically viable 
low-carbon alternatives able to compete with coal and 
natural gas. 
(2) High Prices for Best Case: For a scenario of low operating 
costs (20% below industry average costs) with relatively low 
construction costs and discount rates, the fair return price is 
much higher than current electricity rates and more than 
comparably subsidized wind and solar. Therefore, nuclear 
even with financial guarantees is uneconomic and entails a 
high probability of default. 
(3) High Probability of Costly Default: Given that the best case 
fair return price is well above current electricity prices (and 
probable prices even with high carbon charges), and 
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considering historical construction cost overruns in the 
industry and the high operating costs for current nuclear 
power generation, there is a high likelihood of default. This 
will create the need for the government to perform on the 
guarantees as was the case with the failure of financial 
guarantees for shale oil in the 1980s. 
 In a competitive economic system, subsidies, taxes, and controls 
all change costs and thereby distort the allocation of resources relative to 
the efficiency of a competitive system. In seeking to encourage non-
carbon electricity generation, it is desirable to preserve competitive 
mechanisms as much as possible, especially when dealing with hard to 
predict competitiveness and especially future innovation required to 
produce the most efficient long-run electricity production at a given level 
of carbon emissions. For these reasons, it is desirable to subsidize all 
alternative generation methods equally so that competition and informed 
private decisions produce the most efficient electricity generation 
systems. Given the negative evidence on nuclear viability cited in this 
Article and the potentially high cost of government financial guarantees, 
policymakers should clearly address the questions formulated below. 
(1) Subsidy Distortion: Given the implied magnitude of the 
financial guarantee subsidy for nuclear (more than 10¢ per 
kilowatt hour), why use a much greater subsidy for nuclear 
than for other noncarbon renewable energy alternatives?  To 
ensure efficient allocation of scarce resources, should 
competing alternatives not be subsidized equally? 
(2) Competitive Equality: Given that the administration of the 
federal financial guarantees means selecting a few producers 
that will be the guarantee beneficiaries and thus precluding 
all other potential producers, why use a form of subsidy that 
requires government selection of a small number of 
preferred producers? 
(3) Encouraged Abandonment Risk: Given that financial 
guarantees, especially guarantees for a high percentage of 
the capital outlays, actually encourage abandonment, why 
are we using a subsidy that encourages abandonment and 
high costs with no output benefit rather than a 
straightforward production subsidy of so many cents per 
kilowatt hour? 
(4) Best Form of Subsidy: Given that financial guarantees work 
well when there is a virtual certainty of economic viability 
and are very costly when there is not economic viability, an 
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obvious question is: why are we using financial guarantees 
for nuclear production rather than performance-based output 
subsidies? In particular, why not have the same time 
decreasing output subsidy for all non-carbon new electricity 
generation? 
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Exhibit 155 
Average Power Plant Operating Expenses for Major 
Investor-Owned Electric Utilities: 2007, 2002, 1997 
 
(Mills per Kilowatthour)  
 
Plant Type 2007 2002 1997 
Operation       
Nuclear 9.2 8.54 11.02 
Fossil Steam 3.49 2.54 2.22 
Hydroelectric[1] 7.71 5.07 3.29 
Gas Turbine and Small 
Scale[2] 
2.89 2.72 4.43 
Maintenance       
Nuclear 5.79 5.04 6.9 
Fossil Steam 3.39 2.68 2.43 
Hydroelectric[1] 5.17 3.58 2.49 
Gas Turbine and Small Scale[2] 2.53 2.38 3.43 
Fuel       
Nuclear 5.01 4.6 5.42 
Fossil Steam 24.02 16.11 16.8 
Hydroelectric[1] — — — 
Gas Turbine and Small Scale[2] 56.69 31.82 24.94 
Total       
Nuclear 20 18.18 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 55. See U.S. Energy Information Administration: Independent Statistics and Analysis, Table 
8.2 Average Power Plant Operating Expenses for Major U.S. Investors-Owned Electric Utilities, 
1997 Through 2008 (Jan. 2010), http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/epa/ epat8p2.html. 
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Exhibit 256 
Revenue and Expense Statistics for Major 
Investor-Owned Electric Utilities, 2007, 2002, 1997 
 
(Million Dollars)  
 
 
Description 2007 2002 1997 
Utility Operating Revenues 282,875 219,389 215,083 
  Electric Utility 251,959 200,135 195,898 
  Other Utility 30,305 19,254 19,185 
Utility Operating Expenses 252,216 188,745 182,796 
  Electric Utility 223,297 171,291 165,443 
  Operation 161,939 116,374 104,337 
Production 128,914 90,649 80,153 
 Cost of Fuel 42,178 24,132 31,861 
 Purchased Power 78,124 58,828 37,991 
 Other 8,632 7,688 10,301 
Transmission 6,095 3,494 1,915 
Distribution 3,870 3,113 2,700 
Customer Accounts 4,843 4,165 3,767 
Customer Service 2,959 1,821 1,917 
Sales 249 261 501 
Administrative and General 14,933 12,872 13,384 
  Maintenance 13,675 10,843 12,368 
  Depreciation 18,662 17,319 23,072 
  Taxes and Other 27,839 26,755 25,667 
  Other Utility 28,347 17,454 17,353 
Net Utility Operating Income 30,659 30,644 32,286 
 
 
 56. See U.S. Energy Information Administration: Independent Statistics and Analysis, Table 
8.1 Revenue and Expense Statistics for Major U.S. Investor-Owned Electric Utilities (Jan. 2010), 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/epa/epat8p1.html. 
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Exhibit 3 
Table Illustrating Project Cash Flows per Kilowatt-hour of 
Nuclear Capacity: 
The Case of $5000 Construction Costs, Best Possible Case for 
Operating Expenses 
 
 
Exhibit 3 Notes: 
In this projection, the assumed $5000 construction cost is spread equally in the assumed 5 years to 
build, $1000 in year 0 to year 4. 
Capacity utilization is assumed to grow from 70% in year 6 in increments of 5% per year to the 
target level of 90% in year 10 and to remain at 90% until the end of year 50. 
This example does not assume a decommissioning cost, a reserve for processing nuclear waste, 
incremental working capital for increased production, or even that the debt is repaid at the end of the 
project. Adding in these uses of cash would increase the fair return price above the values computed 
here. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 . .
 . 
50 
Land -500  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 . .
 . 
 
Constructio
n Costs 
-
1000 
-
1000 
-
1000 
-
1000 
-
1000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 . .
 . 
 
Revenue  
 
 
 
 797 85
4 
911 968 102
5 
102
5 
102
5 
. .
 . 
102
5 
Purchased 
Power 
 
 
 
 
 -34 -29 -23 -17 -11 -11 -11 . .
 . 
-11 
Operating 
Expense 
 
 
 
 
 -
473 
-
47
8 
-
484 
-
490 
-
496 
-
496 
-
496 
. .
 . 
-
496 
Net -
1500 
 
-
1000 
-
1000 
-
1000 
-
1000 
324 37
5 
427 478 529 529 529 . .
 . 
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WINTER 2009  Assess the Value 
109 
 
Exhibit 4 
An Illustrative Increase in the Production Subsidy Value of a 
Financial Guarantee 
for a range of Construction Costs for the Best Possible Operating 
Expense Scenario 
 
Construction 
costs  
3500 4500 5500 6500 7500 8500 9500 
Fair Return 
Price: 18% 
28 36 43 57 58 66 74 
Fair Return 
Price: 8% 
10 13 15 18 21 24 26 
Guarantee 
Value 
18 23 28 29 37 42 48 
 
Exhibit 4 Notes: 
The column labeled 5500 is the combination of land and construction costs that was used previously 
in Exhibit 3.  In this exhibit, we are summarizing how the fair return price changes with a change in 
construction costs in increments of $1000s. 
Same purchased power and operating expense. 
 
 
Exhibit 5 
Summary-Overview of Three Scenarios for Operating Expenses 
Scenario %  Revenue Explanation of Differences 
Best Possible  All-in costs are 
58% of revenue 
Purchased power costs are set at 10% (percent of sales) 
compared to an industry average of 27.6% (percent of 
sales). 
Maintenance is much lower than reported in EIA data 
such as the summary in Exhibit 2 to the other tables at 
9.7% (percent of sales). 
Industry Average All-in costs are 
70-78% of 
revenue 
Purchased power is 27.6% (percent of sales) 
Maintenance is 13.1% (percent of sales) 
Realistic Nuclear  All-in costs are 
between 78-88% 
Revenues 
Purchased power is 27.6% (percent of sales) 
Maintenance is 14% (percent of sales) 
 
Exhibit 5 Notes: 
Bernell Stone, Troy Carpenter, and Ricardo Torres estimate empirically the current cost of nuclear 
generated electricity relative to the average price. With high statistical significance, nuclear is found 
to be at least 4 cents above average, which is more than 20% above the average price of 9 ½ cents in 
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2007.
57
   
Exhibit 658 
Price-Cost-Rate Response Subsurface for Baseload Nuclear for 
the Case of Reference Scenario Operating Costs 
  
 
 
 57.  See Bernell K. Stone,  J. Troy Carpenter, & Ricardo A. Torres, How Variation in 
Electricity Generation Mix Explains Well State-By-State Variation in Electricity Prices: Empirical 
Evidence on the Very High Current Cost of Nuclear Generated Electricity (Brigham Young Univ., 
Marriott Sch. of Mgmt., Working Paper, 2009). 
 
 58. Bernell K. Stone & Donald L. Adolphson, A Financial-Economic Assessment of New 
Nuclear Power (Brigham Young Univ., Marriott Sch. of Mgmt., Working Paper, 2009). 
